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Negotiating a human .  
Viveiros de Castro – Descola – Turner
Negotiating a human . Viveiros de Castro – Descola – Turner
Structuralism and the start of negotiations
The wordplay in the title of Claude Lévi-Strauss’ The Savage Mind is well known . La Pensée Sauvage refers to both the “savage” mind and the “wild pansy” . Few 
people, however, pay attention to the idea expressed by the cover of the original 
edition of this volume . On the frontpage there is a flower, whereas on the back 
cover there is a wolverine (Lévi-Strauss 1962) . As Terry S . Turner pointed out, 
it was a way the main message of the book was coded: “The human mind, in its 
natural state, is constituted by the relation between the sensuous forms of the nat-
ural world and the natural mental faculties of perception and association” 
(Turner 2009: 10) . The pages in-between with text written by Lévi-Strauss are, 
in his opinion, content created by subjective consciousness that functions within 
a sphere called “culture” . However, structural analysis leads him to see a certain 
paradox – people who create representations that are supposed to confirm their 
distinctness from nature are not successful at all . Their constructs finally turn 
out to be merely epiphenomena of nature . The pansy, the text and the wolverine 
are of the same world .
In this perspective, structuralism appears as a set of procedures designed 
to show not how people differ from nature, but that these divisions are not as obvi-
ous and unambiguous as we think they are . To be exact, in Elementary Structures 
of Kinship, Lévi-Strauss still treated the dichotomy of nature/culture universally 
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(Lévi-Strauss 1969: 489–490), but since The Savage Mind, he has paid more attention 
to its fluidity (Lévi-Strauss 1966: 128) . He also recognized that, since our minds 
are nature thinking about itself, we must share many of other beings’ qualities . 
For Turner, that was when structuralism opened up the possibility of “a more 
radical theoretical exploration of the sharing of mind or spirit by humans with 
animals and other natural entities” (Turner 2009: 13) . In this respect, the author 
of The View from Afar (Lévi-Strauss 1985) was perhaps most direct in his essay 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau Founder of the Sciences of the Man (Lévi-Strauss 1983) . Claude 
Lévi-Strauss manifested his anti-humanistic attitude by pointing out and eval-
uating two cultural models of the human being’s relation to the surrounding 
world . In the first one, he depicted humans as beings functioning between 
nature and culture . He linked the second one with classification systems, by 
means of which humans have been radically separated from the world of nature . 
Criticising the anthropocentric attitude characteristic of Euro-Atlantic cultures, 
Lévi-Strauss pointed to “the myth of the exclusive dignity of human nature, which 
subjected nature itself to a first mutilation” (Lévi-Strauss 1983: 41) . In his view, this 
mutilation is indirectly connected with the crystallization of the modern mean-
ing of the term “nature” and the domain of phenomena considered as natural, 
universal and separated from the social world . The emergence of further criteria 
distinguishing between humans and other beings ultimately served, according 
to this approach, to depreciate certain human groups as well . The culturally sta-
ble vision of humanity went hand in hand with justifications for the separation 
of one’s own people from strangers . While former were considered to be people, 
latter were not (Viveiros de Castro 2013; Pacukiewicz, Pisarek 2017: 248) .
In this introduction I wished to present a part of the intellectual backdrop 
of the debate on how a given culture constructs worlds inhabited by various 
“intentional beings”, and how it developed within the contemporary cultural 
anthropology . Interestingly, this debate is particularly lively within the commu-
nity of scholars focusing on South American indigenous people . It is probably, 
at least in part, due to the impact of Lévi-Strauss’ work and heritage . Above all, 
however, it should be ascribed to a number of insights into the relational forms 
between indigenous people and the natural world (Descola 1994; Århem 1996; 
Lima 1996; Bird-David 1999) .
The aim of this article, however, is not searching for sources of such reflection, 
but trying to reconstruct three anthropological models related to it . Each among 
these models concerns manners and effects of negotiating what is human . Each 
is based on specific assumptions about the nature of the relationship between 
nature and culture . I intend to compare these models and describe their potential 
for expanding the field of anthropological research . I would also like to take 
a look at how they relate to the domains of what is human and what is cultural 
in Western knowledge discourses .
I will focus on the concepts developed by three anthropologists: Eduardo 
Viveiros de Castro, Phillipe Descola and Terry S . Turner . They all conducted 
research among Amerindians, each in his investigations referred to the structural 
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imagination of Claude Lévi-Strauss, and each considered similar theoretical 
and methodological problems . Their discussion has become one of the most 
important debates in cultural anthropology of the 21st century . I will also use 
the framework developed by Terry S . Turner, to outline the limitations of this 
discussion .
Negotiating perspectives
To understand how Viveiros de Castro interprets Euro-Atlantic ways of thinking 
about what is human and what is cultural, it is necessary to explore his under-
standing of perspectivism . This is the central point of reference for the criticism 
of Western, inter-species distinctions, one that Viveiros de Castro uses to disman-
tle the concept of “nature” (Viveiros de Castro 2013, 2014: 55–56) .
The “perspectival quality” of Amerindian thought – characteristic of many 
groups living in South America – consists in the deeply internalised assumption 
that “the world is inhabited by different sorts of subjects or persons, human 
and nonhuman, which apprehend reality from distinct points of view” (Viveiros 
de Castro 1998: 469) . Let us develop this general statement by reconstructing 
Viveiros de Castro’s argument . First of all, he pointed out that for us the situ-
ation is simple: people see themselves as human beings . Using the same logic, 
an animal, looking at another animal, also sees an animal . Accordingly, spirits 
are spirits to each other .
However, if we look at the perspectival approach to the world, we find 
that predators (such as jaguars) and ghosts perceive humans as prey animals . 
On the other hand, prey animals look at people and see ghosts or predators . More-
over, animals see themselves as human beings . They have their human homes 
and customs . Their food is not blood but, for example, manioc beer . Feathers are 
not something natural for them, but decorations .1 Their life in a group is ruled 
by the same laws that govern human societies . Viveiros de Castro summarises 
this way of thinking as follows:
In sum, animals are people, or see themselves as persons . Such a notion is vir-
tually always associated with the idea that the manifest form of each species 
is a mere envelope (a ‘clothing’) which conceals an internal human form, usu-
ally only visible to the eyes of the particular species or to certain trans-specific 
beings such as shamans . This internal form is the ‘soul’ or ‘spirit’ of the animal: 
an intentionality or subjectivity formally identical to human consciousness, mate-
rializable, let us say, in a human bodily schema concealed behind an animal mask 
(Viveiros de Castro 1998: 470–471) .
1 A schema explaining the complex relationships between beings and their points of view can 
be found in César E . Giraldo Herrer (2018: 26) .
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Interestingly, similar systems of organizing and conceptualizing the world 
of humans and animals can be found all over the world, especially among 
hunter-gatherer people . They rarely encompass all living organisms . We must, 
therefore, assume that Viveiros de Castro applies a far-reaching generalisation, 
which is supposed to reveal a principle that organizes human – nonhuman 
relations and which is an alternative to that prevalent in the West . Thus, our 
style of thinking is confronted with one that are radically different . At the same 
time, we should note that the analyses conducted by the Brazilian anthropologist 
are always based on ethnographic data – his own and other anthropologists’ 
(Viveiros de Castro 2012: 49–63) .
To explain what it is like to be human according to the perspectival inter-
pretation, Viveiros de Castro refers to specific native mythological narratives . 
He points out that in many of the cosmogonical stories quoted by groups such 
as the Araweté, there is no distinction between humans and animals . All beings 
communicate with each other and belong to one category (Viveiros de Castro 
2014: 156) . But most importantly, in mythical stories, the process of separating 
human and animal spheres follows the logic opposite to the one constituting 
the backdrop of the theory of evolution . It is not humans who distinguish them-
selves from other species in time . In his article “Cosmological deixis and Amerin-
dian perspectivism” Viveiros de Castro wrote: “The original common condition 
of both humans and animals is not animality but rather humanity” (Viveiros de 
Castro 1998: 472) .
Thus, we begin to sketch the definition of the scope of what is human in per-
spectivism . The starting point for thinking about the social world is the common 
condition of all living beings . Therefore, the Amerindian perspective as deeply 
ecological – it extends the limits of what is human onto the worlds that we, 
in Europe, have excluded from its scope . It becomes a contemporary “ecosophy” 
(Reichel-Dolmatoff 1976) .
However, it is not the final conclusion of the Brazilian anthropologist . Viveiros 
de Castro is interested in the general human condition in the thought systems he 
studies, which leads us, unexpectedly, to semiotics and to relationships between 
various Amerindian groups and their ethnographers . When the former said 
to the latter that they were humans, they did not think of themselves as a spe-
cies, and more broadly – they did not think of themselves as belonging to any 
objectified category . Rather, they used the pronoun “we” to describe themselves . 
Only with time (in their relationships with ethnographers) ethnonyms became 
a way of defining one’s own group . Previously, however, they were usually used 
to talk about others – those who were objectified .
The above example indicates that the question of being human may refer 
not only to the species and the associated reified category, but also to the field 
of deictic expressions . Therefore, subjectivity, which in perspectivism becomes 
the main determinant of humanity, should be seen as pertaining to semiotics . 
Viveiros de Castro’s view on this is well illustrated in an excerpt from his lectures 
entitled Cosmological Perspectivism in Amazonia and Elsewhere:
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“Subject” is the semiotic position correlated with the capacity to say “I” in a (…) 
virtual cosmological discourse . “Object,” by the same token, is that which 
is “talked” about . As will become clear in the following lectures, I am relying 
essentially on [Émile] Benveniste’s seminal work on “subjectivity in language” 
as expressed in the pronominal set . I use “person” as a synonym of “subject,” 
when wishing to mark the fact that persons are “objects” capable of acting as “sub-
jects .” This notion of “person” is equally pronominal and can also be derived 
from Benveniste . My metaphors come, therefore, from semiosis, not production 
or desire (Viveiros de Castro 2012: 71) .
Where in this concept, emerging at the intersection of indigenous discourses 
and scientific concepts (Kleczkowska 2018: 111) should we locate animals? They 
are accounted for in a distributive manner, which means that each species of liv-
ing beings is treated as a separate entity class . However, they do not belong 
in any hierarchical order . For it is not possible to speak of “animality” as opposed 
to “humanity” in a situation, where a given language (as in the case in many 
Amerindian cultures) does not provide any collective expression that embraces 
this diversity as homogeneity at another level . Such an image of the world 
(although, for Viveiros de Castro, it is not about representation but, above all, 
about “embodied” dispositions), makes it necessary for us to rethink the opposi-
tion of nature and culture .
The former cannot be treated as an animal domain, just as culture ceases 
to be an exclusive domain of humanity (as we see it) . No kind of creatures can 
be assigned to the superior, objectified category of nature . Humans and non-
humans (in the Western sense) constitute a complex mosaic of entities defined 
solely in contextual terms . The human is one of many . This diversity and equiv-
alence of intentional organisms makes each of them a potential subject . This 
is how humanity is understood from perspectivist viewpoints . It is directly 
connected with cultural order . This is where we encounter the most significant, 
non-intuitive, reversal of meanings . For if “culture is the subject’s nature” and “it 
is the form in which every subject experiences its own nature” (Viveiros de Castro 
1998: 477), the culture in question is seen in a different way than in the West-
ern tradition of the imaginary order . It does not mean that Amerindians think 
of animals as human beings . The manoeuvrability of the relationship between 
different classes of existence is more important – to ascribe humanity to a being 
means to recognize that what a given animal is for another animal is the same 
as what a human being is for another human being, i .e . “the logical equivalence 
of the reflexive relations” (Viveiros de Castro 1998: 477) .
In perspectivism, talking about culture and nature is no longer unambiguous . 
The meanings underlying these concepts have been shaken by the establishment 
of relations between perspectival views and non-European cosmologies . This 
is an opportunity to develop a new model of the world: one in which there are 
many natures and one culture . Viveiros de Castro would like, first of all, to reverse 
the order established within the framework defined as cultural relativism . 
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It is the nature that takes on the character of a distributor, while the culture 
becomes an attribute associated with the deictic way of thinking about subjec-
tivity . Such turn violates the anthropocentric point of view, because it challenges 
one of the central Western notions of the “physical continuity” and “metaphysical 
discontinuity” between humans and animals . In the semiotic approach proposed 
by perspectivism, the opposite is true:
(…) if Culture is the Subject’s nature, then Nature is the form of the Other as body, 
that is, as the object for a subject . Culture takes the self-referential form of the pro-
noun ‘I’; nature is the form of the non-person or the object, indicated by the imper-
sonal pronoun ‘it’ (Viveiros de Castro 1998: 479) .
Negotiating nature
Phillipe Descola proposes a different, though related, way of reconfiguring 
our thinking about human/animal relations . Successor to Claude Lévi-Strauss 
and Françoise Héritier in the Collège de France (the Chair of Anthropology 
of Nature), he based his concept on a reformulation of the object of anthropolog-
ical research and the model of relations between living beings and the surround-
ing reality . For Descola every phenomenon can be actualised in different ways 
because of our ability to create relation of correspondence and opposition between 
selected qualities of everything we perceive . He builds upon some of Lévi-Strauss’ 
ideas . When we read fragments of The Raw and the Cooked, the convergences are, 
actually, quite significant:
At the beginning of this introduction I explained that I had tried to transcend 
the contrast between the tangible and the intangible by operating from the out-
set at the sign level . The function of signs is, precisely, to express the one by 
means of the other . Even when very restricted in number, they lend themselves 
to rigorously organized combinations which can translate even the finer shades 
of the whole range of sense experience . We can thus hope to reach a plane where 
logical properties, as attributes of things, will be manifested as directly as flavors 
or perfumes; perfumes are unmistakably identifiable, yet we know that they 
result from combinations of elements which, if subjected to a different selection 
and organization, would have created awareness of a different perfume . Our 
task, then, is to use the concept of the sign in such a way as to introduce these 
secondary qualities into the operations of truth (Lévi-Strauss 1996: 14) .
Descola seems to treat this concept in a radical way . Challenging the tradition 
of Boyle and Locke (Descola 2014: 272), he recognizes that in Hume’s work we can 
find views which abolish the division into primary and secondary qualities . It is not 
Descola’s idea to find one single plane of all phenomena, but he proposes to consider 
their multidimensionality as a distinctive feature (Descola 2014; Lloyd 2007) .
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Another important category necessary to understand shifts introduced by 
Descola is “worlding”, which he understands as a process of stabilization of certain 
features of “what happens to us” (Descola 2014: 272) and “of piecing together what 
is perceived in our environment” (Descola 2014: 272–273) . This process depends 
both on the cognitive apparatus and the motor abilities of individual beings . 
Descola applied the Umwelt category, introduced by Jakob von Uexküll, to define 
perspective, stating that the relevant characteristics of a given environment can 
only be recognised and used from the position of a given biological form (Kull 
2001) . The way we move, reproduce or acquire food influences the way in which 
we experience the world of particular species and individuals .
However, Descola is not only interested in confirming these findings, but 
uses them as a basic model of the relationship between a human and the world 
around him or her . The world, therefore, appears primarily as a significant num-
ber of potential features and relations .
Material and immaterial objects of our environment are not in the heavens 
of eternal ideas, ready to be grasped thanks to our predispositions, nor are they 
merely social constructs giving shape and meaning to raw matter; they are only 
bundles of features, some of which we detect and some of which we ignore 
(Descola 2014: 273) .
How does this process work? It is probably not spontaneous, nor is it deprived 
of regularity . According to Descola, it depends heavily on “ontological filters” 
which stabilize environmental affordances (Gibson 1977) . Therefore, differences 
between human communities occur not only at the level of differently organized 
institutions, economic systems, values and models – these are only the results 
of more basic patterns organizing our lives within the world .
Thus “worlding” takes place within specific ontological regimes . Anthro-
pology is to examine these regimes and ask questions about how human worlds 
are constituted at the cognitive and sensory-motor level . However, we are not 
dealing here with any universal matrix . An ontological filter is created as a result 
of interaction with the surrounding organisms – it is a way to coordinate human 
and nonhuman behaviours which, as soon as they stabilize, can be passed 
on intergenerationally as a cognitive schema .
This model of relations between individual beings – including the level at which 
affiliations connecting selected qualities of the world are constituted – is then used 
by Descola to undermine the dualism of nature and culture and to replace it with 
a dialectic view (Descola, Toro 2016) . Like Bruno Latour, Descola recognizes that 
the opposition prevalent in Western discourses is based on an ethnocentric assump-
tion that people can differ, but there is only one nature . This prevents us from 
examining the actual diversity of relations between humans and other beings liv-
ing in the world, and from seeing the levels at which selected elements of the lived 
world combine as things and organisms identical to each other and existing in rela-
tion to other things and organisms equally separated from each other .
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Only analysis of ontological regimes will enable exploration of various forms 
of interdependence between the order of nature and culture . It will also reveal 
the complexity of these relations and allow them to be conceptualized in a dif-
ferent way . For Descola, the basic distinction is an awareness of the difference 
between material processes and mental states, which is characteristic of every 
human collective . However, he emphatically distanced himself from the old, west-
ern opposition of body and mind . Rather, he recognises that this European dichot-
omy is one of many possible variations of the universal way in which the human 
species perceives the world . As I understand it, it is equivalent to the difference 
that Viveiros de Castro reduced to the “he” – “I/you” relationship, which then 
undergoes a series of reconfigurations .
Such frame allows Descola to build a schema containing four basic ontologies . 
Each of them is a model created through far-reaching generalization but derived 
from comparative research among groups living in different parts of the globe 
at different times . Each of them points to a different way of organizing relations 
between humans and nonhumans, and at the same time, reveals a specific type 
of tension between differently understood natures and cultures .
The first ontology Descola mentioned is “Animism” . It relates mainly to the Indi-
ans of South America, the indigenous peoples of Siberia and Southeast Asia . 
It is a system in which humans and nonhumans, constituting a common category 
of conscious beings, live within bilateral social relations (friendship, exchange, hos-
tility, seduction) . Animals are also imagined as individuals who lead lives in their 
own communities, organized similarly to human communities . The domain 
of social life is thus extended to include a number of nonhuman communities .
“Totemism” – the second modus – is linked with the cosmologies of Austra-
lian Aborigines . However, it is understood differently than in the classic work 
by Lévi-Strauss (Lévi-Strauss 1963) . Within this ontology, different beings share 
common physical, behavioural, and ethical attributes, beyond the species’ bound-
aries . Thus, totem names are not biological taxa, but rather abstract qualities that 
identify all people and nonhumans belonging to a given totemic group (Bran-
denstein 1982; Descola 2006) . For Descola, “totemism” is not only a classification 
system, but rather a regime alternative to “animism” . What distinguishes this 
regime is a different distribution of features which we tend to unambiguously 
associate with the order of nature and culture . Among the Australian Aborigines 
they permeate differently constructed classes of existence .
“Analogism” – the third ontology – is based on the conviction that the world 
is made up of entities characterized by various forms and substances . They are 
extremely fragmented, but often form complex networks of dependencies – for 
example, one that takes on the form of the Great Chain of Being (Descola 2013: 
145) . This, however, is only a consequence of imagining the world as a whole 
composed of an infinite number of separate elements . Descola claims that “Anal-
ogism can be seen as a hermeneutic dream of completeness” (Descola 2013: 145) 
and adds that tracing analogies, relations and entanglements arises from the need 
to seek continuity in a system devoid of such continuity .
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“Naturalism” is the last of the four ontologies . It is related to the regimes 
governing Western modernity . Within this framework, people have established 
and objectified the sphere of nature, understood as a domain of determinism 
and order . Its opposite was the social space fully controlled by people – origi-
nators of signs, norms and values . Today, we are still witnessing the oscillation 
of scientific discourse, and often colloquial discourse, between the poles marked 
out by these two views, enabling both extremely constructivist and extremely 
naturalistic forms of interpreting the world around us .
Descola’s aim is to break down such dichotomies and interpretation patterns . 
As Latour noticed, he does it primarily by shifting nature from a “resource” 
to a “theme” (Latour 2009: 1 .) Thus “naturalism” becomes an ontology that can 
be challenged through revealing its historical sources and relativizing the hidden 
ways in which it creates order in the world .
Negotiating culture
Terry S . Turner was very sceptical about these concepts . First of all, he pointed 
out upon a closer look at Amerindian ways of thinking about nature and people, 
it becomes obvious that they do not form a homogeneous philosophical system, 
nor a single, coherent cosmology . Turner, of course, realized that Viveiros de 
Castro and Descola used models based on various data, but he also pointed out 
that omitting discrepancies and contradictions that occur within or between 
selected societies makes it impossible to draw conclusions about one single 
vision of the world and of culture . He also emphasized that views expressed 
in Amazonian cultures should not be taken out of their context – unless, instead 
of understanding them, we wish to engage in a kind of philosophical exercise .
Given his critique, it is interesting to see whether Turner offers another frame-
work, granting an original outlook on similar research problems . He does, indeed, 
and I will now use it to show limitations of two models described above .
First of all, Turner develops structuralist ideas presented by Viveiros de Cas-
tro and Descola, but gives them a different direction . He is in favour of a perspec-
tive centred around the distributive concept of culture, focusing on contextually 
embedded analyses, allowing to demonstrate the specificity of humans’ relation 
to the surrounding world within individual human-nonhuman groups . He is very 
cautious when making generalisations, and wherever possible, he refers to his 
own research among the Kayapo Indians . This is not, in my opinion, merely 
a precaution, but a strategy, whereby he resets the research area and reformulates 
Lévi-Strauss’ concept of structure . For Turner, it is a “series or group of internal 
transformations in the face of the process of development of existence” (Turner 
2009: 37) – modifications based on transformation and construction of symbols, 
bodies and spiritual identities .
In other words, Turner recognized that in order to explore how culture, nature 
and subject are understood, one has to take a closer look at one or more groups 
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and see how complex gradation of mediation between different levels of human 
and nonhuman organisation takes place within them . Otherwise, even conceptual 
acrobatics won’t lead us beyond the early structuralist concept of nature-culture 
relationship . This framework allows us to see that, irrespective of our efforts, 
the binary opposition of mutually exclusive classification categories, defined 
by the presence or absence of certain features, assigned to the selected entities, 
remains intact . Perspectivism and the scheme of four ontologies constitute 
attempts to go beyond this dichotomy, but in fact, they perpetuate it . Thus, they 
do not provide any insight into the perception of the world by representatives 
of non-Western cultures . Turner pointed out that both “nature” and “culture” 
are abstract concepts that can be used at different levels of generalization . They 
appear as abstractions but may also serve to define the character of specific com-
munities and natural species (Turner 2009: 28) .
So where should we start? Turner believes that we should revisit the eth-
nographic details provided by Viveiros de Castro and Descola . This will allow 
us to understand what “nature of culture” and the domain of nature can be for 
selected groups of South American Indians . The task is much more modest, as far 
as the scope of research is concerned, but not at all easier in terms of its objectives .
Turner noted that myths analysed by Viveiros de Castro indicate the impor-
tance of proto-cultural features of animals . They can use bow and arrow and make 
bonfires to cook meals . These skills, however, express a certain transitional state, 
since the essence of a fully developed culture is not so much to possess these 
qualities, as to have “the reflexive ability to produce the process of producing 
them, as a generalized and infinitely replicable form of activity” (Turner 2009: 20) . 
It is “a reflexive process of meta-objectification, in an abstracted and generalized 
form: that is, of the process of objectification itself” (Turner 2009: 20) .
Thus, culture does not exclude nature in this Amazon interpretation, nor 
is it equal to it – it serves rather to transform, preserve and reproduce it by cre-
ating subsequent meta-forms of earlier processes used in its processing . The cul-
tural order is associated primarily with the ongoing transformations of nature . 
At the basic level, these transformations can be introduced by both humans 
and animals, plants and inanimate beings .
The Kayapo actually recognize that other beings have their own forms of home 
or language . Turner explains they can also see that these forms are completely 
different from the ones developed in human communities . The Kayapo do not 
recognize that they identify themselves in relation to other animals as humans 
identify themselves in relation to humans . Rather, they think that all living beings 
undergo a similar process, through which they shape and try to maintain the unity 
of “form” and “being”: “orientation, forms of consciousness and energetic force that 
drives these processes constitute what we, and the indigenous peoples of Ama-
zonia, call their spirits” (Turner 2009: 37) . People and animals participate in this 
process in the same way . It occurs as the bodies grow, age and die . When we eat, 
drink, hunt, breed . This is the first level of transformation of the surrounding order 
and, at the same time, of its objectivization, accessible to all beings .
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Turner emphasized that according to Kayapo, no one is born human right 
away, just as no one is born as a jaguar or an anteater . A human foetus is simply 
an animal, and so is an infant . However, as a child, it goes through successive 
stages of life, during which “natural” forms are transformed into hybrid ones . 
The Kayapo are beings connected with their social identities, perspectives 
and positions (such as maturity, adulthood, old age – manifesting themselves not 
only in the biological form of bodies, but also in ornaments, hairstyles, gestures) . 
The physiological body is thus complemented by the “social body” . After death, 
however, the human is transformed into an animal again .
So, what is the difference between a human and an animal in this case? 
On the most basic level, there is none . Both undergo the same process of formation 
of a living creature having a soul . But humans, in addition, are able to carry out 
complex, multi-level transformations of all the “natural” elements that they use 
and that surround them .
In order to understand this process, one more point needs to be clarified . 
What is “nature” according to the Kayapo? In short, it is all that exists and lasts 
regardless of human activity . When a human being acts, culture appears, under-
stood as 
a “super-nature” (…) a qualitatively distinct order of existence contrasted 
to “nature” in a mutually exclusive binary contrast (…) . The essence of this cul-
tural increment is the application of natural transformational processes (such 
as fire) to themselves (as in the use of fire to make fire), thus generalizing and rep-
licating what in nature remain relatively isolated processes (Turner 2009: 36) .
This is how the indigenous people in the groups described by Turner see the dif-
ferences between humans, animals, plants and objects . Structurally inspired 
analysis can demonstrate both a common ground and the dynamic emergence 
of differences between these orders .
Endless negotiations
Each of the models presented above allows us to extend the field of anthropo-
logical research, and each of them gives us the opportunity to have a fresh look 
at the terms used in the anthropological discourse . Each of them negotiates 
the scope of what is human, cultural and natural . But the way in which these 
negotiations proceed, and their goals differ significantly . In the last part of this 
article I will try to present a synthetic picture of each of these three strategies, 
used for rethinking the relationship between the human and the world . This 
picture will come to light when I place these strategies within Turner’s framework 
and use it as a tool to detect and demonstrate transformational structures upon 
which they are based . Introduction of the perspectivist model into the discourse 
of Western humanities came with clearly defined goals . Viveiros de Castro wanted 
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to dismantle the concept of “nature” . He considered it to be decolonization prac-
tice, based on the introduction of a subversive concept within the reified struc-
tures of philosophical discourse (Viveiros de Castro 2014: 92) . He wished to lay 
bare the ontological categories, through which we think about our relationship 
with nature . How did he propose to do it? At the most basic level, of course, he 
presented perspectivism as an alternative to the Western way of conceptualizing 
the world . Perspectivism, however, is not a local ontology, which Viveiros de 
Castro described as an interesting peculiarity . It is rather a compact theoretical 
construct, built through re-evaluation of categories characteristic for Western 
discourses of knowledge .
The first attempt to challenge the reified order is the inversion of con-
cepts of nature and culture . The one that was used as an attributive category 
is here included in the distributive one . Hence the multiplicity of natures, but 
only one culture . Viveiros de Castro shifted these concepts on a scale ranging 
from the abstract to the specific . He used classical anthropological differenti-
ation to make the first strategic shift, creating a multinaturalistic perspective – 
non-intuitive, but thinkable, since it is only a variant within a structural system 
of transformations . The opposition is intact, but its poles are reversed .
However, this was not the end of the transformation, because Viveiros de 
Castro introduced the second opposition, whose aim was to strengthen the first 
one between the deictically and categorically conceptualized spheres of social 
order . Due to this shift, he was able to maintain a dualistic order, while introduc-
ing within it a new dynamic, allowing for shifts along the human/nonhuman 
axis and, above all, the redefinition of these categories . He also introduced a new 
type of relational subject that goes far beyond the “human” . Combining it with 
the order of culture, he strengthened its attributive character and extended its 
reach onto the sphere of all living beings . Nature, on the other hand, acquired 
the character of objectified, differentiated and distinguishable wholes, thus taking 
the place of culture in the structural model .
According to Viveiros de Castro, human/nonhuman and culture/nature thus 
form the basic matrix, built upon two principles of transformation – generality/
specificity and deixis/categorisation . Such a scheme and its related interpre-
tative ideas allow us to extend the scope of anthropological research and give 
us more freedom to explore different types of relationships between humans 
and other beings . However, they also allow us to describe only a few possible 
variants of these relationships . In the end, perhaps, this proposal should be 
treated as an attempt to transform the Western myth of the human (Viveiros de 
Castro, Danowski 2017: 6) by introducing additional transformation axes, and by 
extending its subject area .
Viveiros de Castro’s next move was to blur the line between the emic 
and the etic (Pike 1967; Harris 1976) . On the one hand, we are dealing with a the-
oretical proposal deeply rooted in the analysis of specific cosmologies . It gives us 
an insight into the local ways of perceiving social and natural realities that are far 
removed from Western thinking styles . On the other hand, however, the Brazilian 
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anthropologist reduces them to modified notions, grounded in the humanist tra-
dition . He clearly stated that his project was speculative and conducted within 
the scope of philosophical discourse . Thus, we see that perspectivism, although 
often presented as an indigenous construct, is a theory practiced only outside its 
original context, far from being a reconstruction of an emic vision of the world . 
This specific characteristics of perspectivism requires clarification . It was achieved 
by the combination of two incompatible orders . In Viveiros de Castro’s work, etic 
gains meaning through emic and the distinction between etic and emic turns out 
to be unnecessary . Paradoxically, it upholds a sharp opposition between Western 
and non-Western knowledge systems, while the argument occurs only within 
the former, using concepts that are central for these systems .
Such understanding of perspectivism presents it as a decontextualized hybrid, 
drawing its strength from the game of equivocation . Significantly, for Viveiros 
de Castro this is not a simple logical error, which a good intercultural transla-
tion should avoid, but a well-developed intellectual strategy for the multifaceted 
transformation of Western imagination structures (Viveiros de Castro 2014: 87) . 
The Brazilian anthropologist’s goal is to trigger the practice of an anthropology 
built on the basis of non-Western imaginary constructs but using the already 
developed conceptual framework .
However, dissolution of the nature/culture opposition and transformation 
of the field with which this opposition is associated, involves two concessions . 
The first concerns the need to reduce the history of specific collectives, within 
which specific, dynamic and variable forms of world structuring are created, 
to atemporal structural models . The second, related concession involves the syn-
chronous character of these models, which results from their positioning 
as unambiguously external to anthropological discourse . In order to generate 
subversive force within the discourse, they must be considered as radically 
foreign . As a result, one sharp opposition is replaced by another, contrasting 
the cosmologies of the Moderns and the Natives . It turns out that the division into 
the sphere of nature and culture and the human and nonhuman is relativized 
in Viveiros de Castro’s work precisely by maintaining tension between the West-
ern and the non-Western . One matrix used to produce the difference is replaced 
by another, equally durable .
Descola formulated his goals in a different way and used different strate-
gies . First of all, he relativized the categories that have so far been essentialized . 
At the same time, he established a new point of reference – a universally accepted 
vision of the world, which enabled the description of structural relations between 
ontologies – a “relativistic universalism” (Descola 2013: 305) – one that will oper-
ate on the level of analysis and anthropological interpretation of the relations 
of continuity and discontinuity, identity and difference, similarities and differ-
ences established by people between the entities among which they live . Above 
all, however, it aimed to provide a distanced view of one of the central dogmas 
of Western thinking – a clear division into the sphere of nature and that of society 
(Descola 1996: 82 .)
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Viveiros de Castro placed recognition of equivocation as the driving force 
of radical change in his decolonization work . Descola, on the other hand, estab-
lished an implicit “fifth ontology” (Kapferer 2014: 394) to describe various vari-
ants of relations between the previously separated spheres . It involved modified 
concept of the subject, which does not need to be transcendental, separated from 
the world and making it meaningful . It is enough that such subject recognizes 
other subjects . Culture ceases to be the subject’s attribute and the ability to dis-
tinguish intentional beings from inanimate matter behaving ruled by the laws 
of physics, becomes the subject’s virtue . In this way Descola built his framework 
on the etic level – upon categories developed within the Western knowledge 
systems that enable comprehensible interpretation of the solutions character-
istic of other cultural contexts . In this way, he made it possible to distinguish, 
describe and compare many ontologies, which are primarily meant to be emic 
models, though within comprehensible frames achieved by means of etic cate-
gories . In fact, this arrangement of the relationship between emic and etic allows 
us to show tension between nature and culture and between human and non-
human, as a series of categorization decisions based on the relationship between 
the distributive and attributive understanding of the natural and cultural spheres . 
Perhaps contrary to Descola’s intentions, the multi-quality world he described 
in his ontologies is reduced to a few classification strategies . In this way, how-
ever, the anthropologist is able to de-objectify, contextualize and typologize 
the Western distinction between nature and culture . These categories, however, 
become equivalent to the foundations of the “fifth ontology”: the relational subject 
and the relational world . Due to such a combination, it is possible to dismantle 
the ontological difference between humans and nonhumans imprinted in mod-
ern thinking . At the same time, however, such construct is a matrix superim-
posed on what is external and diverse, providing the basis for establishing basic 
criteria of difference, which, when objectified, form basic points of reference for 
the creation of the difference between pre-modern collectives and their ontologies 
and the Western thought system .
Among the scholars presented in this article, Turner appears to be a con-
servative, although he attempted a similar exercise . However, he abided by 
the framework of anthropological work delineated by Foucault, without trying 
to transform it in any way . For the French philosopher and historian anthropology 
was the discipline that undogmatically broadened meanings, casted doubt on and 
delivered a critique of the discursive figure of the “human” . By reaching out 
to border areas, anthropology creates an opportunity to forge relationships with 
various non-European intellectual, social and material forms in which human 
life functions are locked away (Foucault 2006: 335–346; Pacukiewicz 2015: 107; 
Pisarek 2018: 295) . In constant, two-way translation between entangled emic 
and etic viewpoints, researchers are able to form understandable, yet unobvious 
intellectual constructs with the potential to transcend the foundations on which 
such constructs were built .
 Negotiating a human. Viveiros de Castro – Descola – Turner 63
Turner does not attempt to reformulate the basic notional grid used by struc-
turalists . He delivers a translation that shows one of the many ways in which 
we understand the problem we describe with the reiterated categories of nature 
and culture . This allows him to demonstrate the incoherence, diversity and trans-
formations of views that emerge within the cultures under study . By maintaining 
a reflexive relationship between the emic and the etic, and still keeping an eye 
on the transitions between these orders, he is able to explain how the processes 
of creating attributive understanding, but in a variant far removed from our 
imaginations, can be studied within the framework of a distributive understand-
ing of culture . By preserving the categories that lay foundations to our discourse, 
he diagnoses the character of their approximate equivalents in other systems 
of thought – he examines the relations between the human, nature and culture, 
understood in a different way . He also uses the structuralist toolbox to create 
a model of diachronic structural transformations, which reveal the dynamic 
character of these relationships within one of the researched collectives .
By composing his models within the distributive field of culture, Turner does 
not reduce the complexity of problems arising alongside ethnographic experience, 
and thus avoids furthering the Great Divide between the Modern and the rest 
of the world . At the same time, he shows something that Viveiros de Castro 
and Descola are missing – that the ontologies they described are static and syn-
chronous constructs, which reduce complex processes of mythopractice and those 
through which the world is being structured . Instead of a timeless difference 
(which turns out to be the condition underlying the proposal of both the Bra-
zilian and the French anthropologist – a condition enabling negotiation of what 
is human), Turner notices that these negotiations take place within each collective 
on many levels, in many situations and moments connected, for example, with 
the life of an individual . He also shows that such negotiations have no end, as they 
are always the result of an encounter between structure and events . This makes 
them unfinished, just like Lévi-Strauss’ myths .
Conclusions
In the article I compared three models that constitute attempts of extending 
the field of anthropological research beyond the domains of what is human 
and what is cultural . I have presented the possibilities, but also the limitations 
involved in the proposals related to the most recent resurrection of structuralist 
thought . I also put forward a diagnosis that the attempt to de-essentialise the cat-
egories of nature within these models was based, to a large extent, on the redef-
inition of the category of the subject and the broadening of the sphere of beings 
that can take on the position of a subject . This, in turn, destabilised the category 
of culture, which – in its attributive character – served to strengthen the position 
of the human as distinguished from the world .
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The first of the presented strategies additionally depends on using equiv-
ocation as a tool to more freely manipulate the orders that, so far, have been 
stable . This makes it possible to inscribe a perspectival position into anthropol-
ogy, which in turn facilitates the creation of non-intuitive constructs relativiz-
ing nature and shifting it into the sphere of distributors’ diversity . The human, 
culture and subjectivity, on the other hand, can be intertwined and reduced 
to an attributive category that characterises a wide range of entities . For Viveiros 
de Castro, differences between collectives remain an implicit point of reference – 
so far conceptualized by means of a distributive understanding of culture, but 
within the decolonization project – reduced to the opposition between modern 
and nonmodern cosmologies .
Descola tries to develop a specific meta-ontology in order to adopt various 
ontological regimes for the purposes of comparative analysis . According to him, 
these regimes are responsible for specific forms of nature and culture . Descola also 
deals with the attributive and essentialist understanding of these categories . His 
strategy is to create a distance – to find a new “third degree code” (Lévi-Strauss 
1996: 20) – the myth of mythology which allows us to compare previously incom-
parable levels of reality construction processes . At the same time, however, he 
accepts an atemporal ontological difference as a model of otherness, which makes 
it difficult to track complex transformation games that are more visible from 
the perspective of research into distributively and historically distinct cultures2.
The third strategy – the one used by Turner – consists in using a certain 
fixed onto-epistemology to analyse other onto-epistemologies (I reconstructed 
this standpoint and used it as a framework in a new context in the last part 
of this article) . His is aware of embedding culture in a single tradition and apply-
ing- as a form of creating distinction – a distributive understanding of culture, 
thus remaining sensitive to differences that cannot be reduced to a homogenous 
differentiating instance, such as ontology or cosmology . Paradoxically, it is in this 
variant that the unfamiliar models of constructing and transforming relations 
between the “human”, “nature” and “culture”, are reduced to the smallest extent .
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SUMMARY
Negotiating a human . Viveiros de Castro – Descola – Turner
The article offers an analysis of selected anthropological models transforming the seman-
tic scope of what in the Western discourses of knowledge used to be considered the domain 
of human being . The text presents concepts developed by three anthropologists: Edu-
ardo Viveiros de Castro, Phillipe Descola and Terry S . Turner . Each conducted research 
among the indigenous people of South America, each invoked the structural imagination 
of Claude Lévi-Strauss and considered similar theoretical and methodological problems . 
The models developed by these Amazonianists will be examined based on the methods 
they use to expand the field of anthropological research and to reconfigure its concep-
tual framework . The aim of this article is to determine potential benefits and limitations 
resulting from applying these models in the study of culture .
Keywords: animism, perspectivism, structuralism, posthumanism, ontological turn
